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We have found a security risk in the Liu's cypher based on random signals and feedback, when it
utilizes a large class of noises for communication in its most secure state, the steady state. For the
vulnerability to exist, the noise must have a spectrum which can be transformed to white-like noise
by linear filtering. For the cracking, we utilize the natural properties of power density spectra and
autocorrelation functions. We introduce and demonstrate the method for Lorentzian spectra. Some of
the implications of the results concern the transient operation during changing bits, where the
modulation products of noise cannot be band-limited therefore the cypher is vulnerable. We propose
the application of line filters to provide a proper spectral shape and to improve the security.
Keywords: secure communication by classical physics.
1. Introduction
Recently, there has been an intensifying development in the field of unconditionally
secure communication via separated classical physical systems [1-4]. They were
originally inspired by the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-(like)-noise key exchange protocol
(KLJN-cypher) [5-16] which however contains wired parties to provide a single,
integrated physical system (Kirchhoff-loop) consisting of Alice's and Bob's
communicators at the specifically selected low operational frequencies. The security of
the idealized KLJN cypher is protected by the second law of thermodynamics, that is, by
the impossibility of a perpetual motion machine of the second kind.
In two very recent papers [1,2], Liu has introduced and tested a new, very interesting type
of secure key exchange protocol (Liu-cypher). If it is unconditionally secure, as claimed,
it has the potential to revolutionize secure communication.
The particularly interesting property of the Liu cypher [1,2] stems from the fact that it is a
classical physical system, just like the KLJN-cypher, however it is based on a completely
separated pair of physical systems, which are sending only numbers to each other, even
through email or mail. If the Liu cypher is indeed secure then it makes all the other secure
communicators, RSA, quantum, KLJN, etc, obsolete, complicated, and unnecessary. On
the other hand, no physical law has been identified as the protection of its security.
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Note that communicators unconditionally secure at the conceptual level can never be
absolutely secure at practical applications due to non-idealities; and this statement is valid
also for quantum communicators. However, if Alice and Bob can exchange more key bits
than the information accessible for Eve via eavesdropping, privacy amplification
algorithms will allow an arbitrarily enhancement of the actual security by generating a
short key with enhanced security from the original longer key with greater information
leak.
Therefore, the essential question of cracking any secure physical communicator is as
follows: Can Alice and Bob exchange more information about the key than the
information Eve can extract during the key exchange process? If the answer for the Liu
cypher is yes then it can be made arbitrarily secure. However, if the answer is no then the
cypher has zero security.
2. The Liu-cypher based on feedback and noise
Dr. Liu's has made several attempts to extract the essence of the KLJN cypher and
implement it in new systems without thermal noise and Kirchhoff-law aspects. The first
attempt was an interesting circulator-based model [6] which was criticized, further
developed, and finally cracked in [7] by a circulator-based man-in-the-middle attack.
As we have already mentioned and we want to further emphasize, the newest, very
interesting development [1,2], the Liu cypher, does not require a physical system or
physical law, at all. Even two computers communicating via email or, in principle, two
people communicating with regular mail can use it, if speed is not a problem. And, if the
method works, it is automatically protected even against the man-in-the-middle attack by
broadcasting the signals by Alice and Bob. (Note, broadcasting is different from
authentication, which was a mistake in [1,2]; this is a small but important correction.)
The important question is if the Liu-cypher [1,2] can generate and share an
unconditionally secure key by just sending numbers back and forward between Alice and
Bob. Philosophically, it is very difficult to imagine unconditional security (even at the
conceptual level) in such a way, though such generalized attempts have been already
made, but with no success [17-19].
The protocol of the Liu cypher [1,2] is as follows (see Figure 1). Alice and Bob choose
their own small reflection coefficient ?  and ?  with random (secret) signs and publicly
known uniform absolute value 
  
? = ? = ? << 1 . The secret arrangement of signs stays
valid for the whole clock period. Then, see Figure 1, Alice and Bob reflect the incoming
signals 
  
X
BA
 and 
  
X
AB
 , according to their own reflection coefficients, and also add their
own secret Gaussian random noises   VA(t)  and   VB (t) . The effective values of noise
amplitudes and the noise spectra are equal and publicly known. When they happen to
select a reflection coefficient with opposite signs, ? = ?? , a secure bit is generated and
exchanged during the clock period. For the equations [1,2], see Figure 1.
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ALICE BOB
XAB (n) =?XBA (n ?1) + VA (n)
XBA (n) = ?XAB (n ?1) + VB (n)
  X AB (t ) =?XBA(t ? ? ) + VA(t )
  XBA(t + ? ) = ?X AB (t ) + VB (t + ? )
Figure 1. The protocol of the Liu cypher [1,2]. Continuum time and discrete time versions are given. The
duration of signal roundtrip (propagation+processing) is   2? , or two time-steps, respectively.
The parameters are chosen so that the shortest time constant is ?  which is half of the
signal roundtrip time (propagation+processing). The noises are chosen to have such a
long correlation time   ? c  (>> ? )  (it means a small bandwidth spreading from zero
frequency up to 
  
B
n
) that they can be considered static during the signal roundtrip time.
Under this condition, the system is converging to a geometrical series (see [1,2]) with
power exponent   ?
2 and coefficients dictated by the linear combination of the actual
amplitudes of the noises 
  
V
A
 and 
  
V
B
. The longest time-parameter is the clock period 
  
?
bit
,
which is long enough to include many correlation times of the noise, in order to have a
good statistics, when the noises, signals, and their combinations are time averaged. In
conclusion:
  
? << ?
c
? 1
B
n
<< ?
bit
(1)
SX(f)
f  ?c?1   ??1
A
B
C
  ?bit
?1
1/f 2
1/f 4
Figure 2. Examples for different noise spectra with the same -3 dB bandwidths and similar noise bandwidths.
A: Lorentzian, white noise filtered by a first-order low-pass filter; B: white noise filtered by a second-order low-
pass filter; C: infinitely steep cut-off by digital filtering. Only type C is secure (see Section 3) but it cannot be
reached during normal operation due to transients (see Section 5).
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Alice and Bob extract the sign of the reflection coefficient of the other side by cross-
correlating the returning signal with their own noise [1,2]. The sign of the cross-
correlation coefficient between the local noise amplitude at time   t ??  and the returning
signal amplitude at time   t  is obviously the same as the sign of the reflection coefficient
of the other side [1,2].
In the steady-state, when the geometrical series characterizing the system had practically
reached its actual stationary value (remember the noise was virtually static during the
time scale of the convergence), the Liu cypher was claimed absolutely secure [1,2].
However, it was recognized [1] that during the convergence to the steady state, for
example during the initial transient at the beginning of the clock period, the cypher was
leaking information. Various tricks were proposed to fix these weaknesses [1].
In the present paper, we show an attack against the Liu cypher in its state where it was
believed to be absolutely secure: in its steady state. The results indicate that the shape of
spectrum of the noise is an important parameter not only its bandwidth as it was
originally believed [1,2].
3. Cracking the security of Liu-protocol for Lorentzian noises
We will see that to break the protocol with our presently proposed method, it is essential
that the correlation time of the observed quantities is in the order of ? . This may look
paradoxical because such claim is obviously not valid for the added noises (and resulting
signals which have the same 
  
?
c
), see Eq. 1. To provide the necessary condition for
Lorentzian and similar noises with high-frequency tails a pre-processing will be needed.
The most important reason why our general method of cracking works is the consequence
of the well-known fact that the autocorrelation time of an idealistic white noise is zero.
First, we crack the protocol for the simplest case of added noises   VA(t)  and   VB (t)  when
they have a Lorentzian spectral shape 
  
1+ ( f / f c)
2[ ]
?1
, where the cut-off frequency and
the correlation time are interrelated as 
  
fc = ? c?1. The practical importance of a Lorentzian
is that it results from white noise by a simplest first-order low-pass filter with a single
pole 
  
1+ j
f
fc
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
?1
. It is important to remember that the spectra of the noises are publicly
known quantities.
For Lorentzian noise, the simplest way of cracking is as follows. The spectrum of the
time derivative of a noise with spectrum   S( f )  results in   4?
2 f 2S( f )  spectrum of the
velocity and that will shorten the correlation time of the noise to the required regime. The
reason is that in the case of the Liu cypher the new spectrum becomes   f
2-noise in a
narrow frequency range, at low frequencies, and white noise in the wide range at high
frequencies. Therefore, the correlation time of that white-like noise will approach the
shortest observable time constant in the system which is ? . Thus, Eve can cross-correlate
L.L. Kish, et al
5
the velocity of their sent-out signal with the returning one and that will provide the most
efficient way to extract the reflection coefficients. Below, we show how to extract the
sign of the reflection coefficient at Alice. The sign of the following velocity
crosscorrelation will tell Eve the bit of Alice because its sign will be equal to the sign of
?  :
  
?
AB
(t)?
BA
(t ?? ) = ??
BA
(t ?? ) +W
A
(t)[ ]?BA(t ?? ) =
 =??
BA
2 (t ?? ) + ?W
A
(t)W
A
(t ? 2? ) +???
BA
(t ?? )?
BA
(t ? 3? )
(2)
where the 
  
? i, j(t)  quantities are the time derivatives of the corresponding   X ij(t)  signals
and the   Wk (t)  quantities are the time derivatives of the corresponding   Vk (t)  noise
secrets. The coefficient of the last term at the right-hand-side of Eq. 2 is a small quantity
(  ?
2? ) proportional to   ?
3 which can be dropped. After time averaging, we get:
  
?
AB
(t)?
BA
(t ?? )
t
=??02 + ??WA (2? ) ???0
2
 , (3)
where   ?0
2  (> 0)  is the mean-square signal velocity, 
  
?
WA
(2? )is the autocorrelation
function (with   2?  time-shift) of   WA(t) . As we have pointed out above, the time
derivative of the Lorentzian noise will have zero autocorrelation function for time shifts
?  or greater, thus 
  
?
WA
(2? ) = 0 . Therefore, the sign resulting from Eq. 3 will show the
sign of ? .
Computer simulations for the case of Lorentzian noise generated from damped Brownian
motion and   ? = 0.2  show, see Table 1, that Eq. 3 will crack the cypher with excellent
success rate, greater than 99.999%, within a single correlation time of the noise when the
clock duration   ? = 1000  steps. For clock duration   ? = 100  steps, which is the lower limit
of reasonable 
  
?
c
 correlation times, the same accuracy is obtained within 5 correlation
times of the noises. These success rates and speeds are much greater than those of
indicated between Alice and Bob in [1,2], and this situation is a convincing fact about the
efficiency of the cracking method of Eve.
At this point, we could conclude the paper and stating that the Liu cypher was cracked for
Lorentzian noise. However, Alice and Bob can also learn about the advantage of using
velocity correlation functions and they can enhance their original protocol by using their
  WA(t)  and   WB (t)  noise velocities to do the crosscorrelations instead of the   VA(t)  and
  VB (t)  noise amplitudes originally proposed by Liu [1,2]. Thus, without improving the
Liu cypher, by utilizing the new idea of velocity correlations and comparing the
improved cypher with Eve's cracking protocol, it is unclear how much security actually
remains in the new situation. It is because Alice and Bob may use much shorter clock
cycles with the enhanced cypher thus they may reduce the effectiveness of Eve's method.
The improved protocol will be:
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?
AB
(t)W
B
(t ?? ) = ?W
B
(t ?? ) +W
A
(t)[ ]WB (t ?? ) =
                              =?W
B
2(t ?? ) +W
A
(t)W
B
(t ?? )
  . (4)
After time averaging:
  
?
AB
(t)W
B
(t ?? )
t
=? W
B
2(t ?? )
t
=?W02 , (5)
where 
  
W
0
2  is the mean square of 
  
W
B
.
The remaining but ultimate question is if Eq. 5 is more efficient than Eq. 3. If yes, the
security can be saved by privacy amplification.
However the operation described by Eq. 5 is less accurate than using Eve's
eavesdropping protocol shown above because the terms resulting the DC components in
Eqs. 2 and 4 (see the middle section of the equations) are related as:
  
?
0
2 =
1+ ? 2
1? ? 2( )
2
W
0
2   (6)
see the results [1,2].  On the other hand, the terms representing the noise (to be averaged
out) in Eqs. 2 and 4 (see the middle section of the equations) are related as:
  
W
B
(t)?
A
(t ?? )[ ]
2 ?
W
B
(t)W
A
(t ?? )[ ]
2
1? ? 2
(7)
Thus, the signal-to-noise ratio of Eve's method is   (1+ ?
2) /(1? ? 2) > 1 times greater than
that of Alice's and Bob's new method. This difference results in a greater error rate for
Eq. 5. In conclusion, Alice and Bob must use Eve's method, Eq. 3, to obtain the highest
speed and the lowest error rate.
  
?
bit
 (steps)
Eve (Eq. 3)
  
?
c
= 100  (steps)
Eve (Eq. 3)
  
?
c
= 1000
(steps)
Alice/Bob (Eq. 5)
(Improved Liu)
  
?
c
= 100  (steps)
Alice/Bob (Eq. 5)
(Improved Liu)
  
?
c
= 1000
(steps)
50 85.0% 84.2% 73.5% 71.0%
100 95.6% 95.3% 88.4% 83.9%
200 99.5% 99.5% 97.8% 93%
500 >99.999% >99.99% >99.9% 98%
1000 >99.999% >99.9%
Table 1. Computer simulation results for Lorentzian noise with Eve's cracking method (Eq. 3) and the enhanced
Liu cypher (Eq. 5), at two different correlation times of the secret noises.
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Table 1 shows computer simulation results comparing Eve's cracking method (Eq. 3) and
the enhanced Liu cypher (Eq. 5) with Lorentzian noise spectrum, at two different
correlation times of the secret noises. It can be seen that even though the Liu cypher gets
progressively enhanced compared to the original version [1,2], it still performs weaker
than Eve's method. Thus Alice and Bob must use Eve's method and that means zero
security.
4. Other types of noise spectra
The generalization of the cracking principle described in Section 3 for Lorentzian noises
is simple. It is based on linearly transforming the observed signal to another quantity with
white-like noise characteristics. Let us suppose that the (publicly known) spectrum of the
noises and the signals is   SX ( f ) . Then the observed signals   X AB  and   X BA  must be sent
through a linear filter with amplification   A( f )  :
  
A( f ) =
1
SX ( f )
(8)
Then after the filtering, the new quantities 
  
Y
AB
 and 
  
Y
BA
 will have a white-like noise
spectrum   SY ( f ) in the whole frequency band of operation:
  
SY ( f ) = A( f )
2
SX ( f ) = 1 (9)
Due to the linearity of these operations, the rest of the cracking operation and the other
considerations in Section 3, remain the same, as above.
a. The 
  
Y
AB
 and 
  
Y
BA
 quantities must be used with timing corresponding to the timing of
  
X
AB
 and 
  
X
BA
 .
b. The sign of 
  
Y
AB
(t)Y
BA
(t ?? )
t
 will provide the sign of ? .
c. All the other considerations, comparisons, and conclusions in Section 3 remain the
same because the white noise case provides the best statistics within the shortest duration.
Thus, the best method Alice and Bob can use with utilizing their noises is the situation
when they send their own noise and the observed signals through the same filtering
process. However, Eve's method described in Section 3 stays more efficient.
It is important to note that, for the cracking method to work, the noise spectrum must
have non-zero value up to   ? ?1 . Thus a steep cut-off indicated by C in Figure 2 is immune
against this type of attack. However, noise made from white noise filtered by classical
first, second, etc orders low-pass filters are vulnerable. Note, Liu has mentioned type C
spectra in [2] however the goal was not to secure security but the have a convenient
autocorrelation function. It has been realized first in the present work that not only the
noise-bandwidth but also the spectral shape matters. About practical implications, see the
next section.
Cracking the Liu protocol of secure key exchange
8
5. Implication: relevant type of vulnerability during transient response
Because this attack took place in the working mode where the cypher was believed to be
absolutely secure, a particular attention must be given for this type of attack in the
transient period. This is particularly important because, even if the noise had type C
shape, which remains secure in the steady-state mode, in the transient regime this may
produce combination spectra of A, B, or similar spectra with non-zero amplitude. This
fact implies the necessity to use line filters to secure the type C shape, and this
requirement has not been recognized earlier. But even with idealistic line filters, further
security tests are necessary during normal (transient) key exchange operations by
utilizing the new type of attack described here, in order to assess the practical level of the
remaining security.
6. Conclusion
A substantial vulnerability for Lorentzian and similar noises have been discovered in the
Liu cypher. The vulnerability presents even in the steady state where the cypher was
supposed to be unconditionally secure. In the steady state, the vulnerability can be
avoided by idealistic, infinitely steep cut-off at the high-frequency end of the noise
spectrum. However, staying in the steady state means zero information channel capacity
and that means no communication. As soon as real communication begins, and bits are
changed, the originally idealistic band-limited noise will produce cross-modulation
components with the transients and that means infinite high-frequency tails in the signal
spectrum.
Thus perhaps the most important practical implication of the present results is the
minimal need of applying line filters during normal (transient) operation.
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